DarkDNS: Revisiting the Value of Rapid Zone Update
Raffaele Sommese, Gautam Akiwate, Antonia Affinito, Moritz, M\"uller, Mattijs Jonker, KC Claffy

TL;DR
This paper examines the limitations of current DNS visibility tools in detecting short-lived malicious domains and proposes more timely data sharing methods to improve security and abuse prevention.
Contribution
It highlights the visibility gap in detecting short-lived domains and demonstrates how public data sources can reduce this gap for better abuse detection.
Findings
Daily DNS snapshots miss at least 1% of new short-lived domains
Public data sources can significantly improve detection of malicious domains
Sharing rapid zone updates enhances security research and abuse prevention
Abstract
Malicious actors exploit the DNS namespace to launch spam campaigns, phishing attacks, malware, and other harmful activities. Combating these threats requires visibility into domain existence, ownership and nameservice activity that the DNS protocol does not itself provide. To facilitate visibility and security-related study of the expanding gTLD namespace, ICANN introduced the Centralized Zone Data Service (CZDS) that shares daily zone file snapshots of new gTLD zones. However, a remarkably high concentration of malicious activity is associated with domains that do not live long enough make it into these daily snapshots. Using public and private sources of newly observed domains, we discover that even with the best available data there is a considerable visibility gap in detecting short-lived domains. We find that the daily snapshots miss at least 1% of newly registered and short-lived…
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