POSTER: Testing network-based RTK for GNSS receiver security

TL;DR

This paper investigates the security vulnerabilities of network-based RTK GNSS systems, specifically focusing on spoofing attacks on reference stations and exploring potential countermeasures to enhance robustness.

Contribution

It provides an analysis of how RTK reference station spoofing impacts rover positioning accuracy and proposes countermeasures to improve RTK infrastructure security.

Findings

RTK reference station spoofing degrades rover PNT accuracy

Countermeasures can mitigate spoofing effects

Enhanced security measures improve RTK robustness

Abstract

Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) provide precise location, while Real Time Kinematics (RTK) allow mobile receivers (termed rovers), leveraging fixed stations, to correct errors in their Position Navigation and Timing (PNT) solution. This allows compensating for multi-path effects, ionospheric errors, and observation biases, enabling consumer receivers to achieve centimeter-level accuracy. While network distribution of correction streams can be protected with common secure networking practices, the reference stations can still be attacked by GNSS spoofing or jamming. This work investigates (i) the effect RTK reference station spoofing has on the rover's PNT solution quality and (ii) the potential countermeasures towards hardening the RTK infrastructure.