Flashback: Enhancing Proposer-Builder Design with Future-Block Auctions in Proof-of-Stake Ethereum

TL;DR

This paper proposes a new auction mechanism for Ethereum's proposer-builder separation that includes future block proposers, leading to more profitable and stable equilibria, thereby enhancing blockchain security.

Contribution

It introduces a novel game-theoretic auction design incorporating future proposers in PoS Ethereum, improving upon existing mechanisms for better decentralization and security.

Findings

New auction mechanisms outperform current state-of-the-art in equilibrium profitability.

Inclusion of future proposers stabilizes the game and enhances decentralization.

Experimental results validate the theoretical advantages of the proposed design.

Abstract

Maximal extractable value (MEV) in which block proposers unethically gain profits by manipulating the order in which transactions are included within a block, is a key challenge facing blockchains such as Ethereum today. Left unchecked, MEV can lead to a centralization of stake distribution thereby ultimately compromising the security of blockchain consensus. To preserve proposer decentralization (and hence security) of the blockchain, Ethereum has advocated for a proposer-builder separation (PBS) in which the functionality of transaction ordering is separated from proposers and assigned to separate entities called builders. Builders accept transaction bundles from searchers, who compete to find the most profitable bundles. Builders then bid completed blocks to proposers, who accept the most profitable blocks for publication. The auction mechanisms used between searchers, builders and proposers are crucial to the overall health of the blockchain. In this paper, we consider PBS design in Ethereum as a game between searchers, builders and proposers. A key novelty in our design is the inclusion of future block proposers, as all proposers of an epoch are decided ahead of time in proof-of-stake (PoS) Ethereum within the game model. Our analysis shows the existence of alternative auction mechanisms that result in a better (more profitable) equilibrium to players compared to state-of-the-art. Experimental evaluations based on synthetic and real-world data traces corroborate the analysis. Our results highlight that a rethinking of auction mechanism designs is necessary in PoS Ethereum to prevent disruption.