Deception in Differential Games: Information Limiting Strategy to Induce Dilemma

TL;DR

This paper explores the role of deception in differential games by analyzing a Turret-Attacker scenario with partial information, revealing how Attackers can manipulate the Turret's decisions to their advantage.

Contribution

It introduces a novel case study demonstrating deception strategies in differential games with incomplete information, highlighting the induced dilemma for the defender.

Findings

Deception can be strategically employed in differential games.

Attackers can manipulate the Turret's perception to force suboptimal decisions.

A set of initial conditions enables Attackers to induce a guessing dilemma for the Turret.

Abstract

Can deception exist in differential games? We provide a case study for a Turret-Attacker differential game, where two Attackers seek to score points by reaching a target region while a Turret tries to minimize the score by aligning itself with the Attackers before they reach the target. In contrast to the original problem solved with complete information, we assume that the Turret only has partial information about the maximum speed of the Attackers. We investigate whether there is any incentive for the Attackers to move slower than their maximum speed in order to ``deceive'' the Turret into taking suboptimal actions. We first describe the existence of a dilemma that the Turret may face. Then we derive a set of initial conditions from which the Attackers can force the Turret into a situation where it must take a guess.