Data Trading Combination Auction Mechanism based on the Exponential Mechanism
Kongyang Chen, Zeming Xu, Bing Mi

TL;DR
This paper introduces a privacy-preserving data trading auction mechanism using the exponential mechanism, ensuring high revenue and privacy protection for buyers in data markets.
Contribution
It proposes a novel combination auction mechanism based on the exponential mechanism that addresses privacy concerns in data trading auctions.
Findings
Ensures high auction revenue
Protects buyers' bidding privacy
Effective under different scenarios
Abstract
With the widespread application of machine learning technology in recent years, the demand for training data has increased significantly, leading to the emergence of research areas such as data trading. The work in this field is still in the developmental stage. Different buyers have varying degrees of demand for various types of data, and auctions play a role in such scenarios due to their authenticity and fairness. Recent related work has proposed combination auction mechanisms for different domains. However, such mechanisms have not addressed the privacy concerns of buyers. In this paper, we design a \textit{Data Trading Combination Auction Mechanism based on the exponential mechanism} (DCAE) to protect buyers' bidding privacy from being leaked. We apply the exponential mechanism to select the final settlement price for the auction and generate a probability distribution based on the…
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Taxonomy
TopicsAuction Theory and Applications
