Stealthy Imitation: Reward-guided Environment-free Policy Stealing
Zhixiong Zhuang, Maria-Irina Nicolae, Mario Fritz

TL;DR
This paper introduces Stealthy Imitation, a novel black-box attack method for stealing deep reinforcement learning policies without environment access, and proposes a countermeasure to defend against it.
Contribution
It presents the first environment-free, reward-guided policy stealing attack and a countermeasure, advancing the understanding of model theft vulnerabilities in RL systems.
Findings
Outperforms prior data-free policy stealing methods.
Matching attack query distribution to the victim's reduces imitation difficulty.
Countermeasure significantly diminishes attack effectiveness.
Abstract
Deep reinforcement learning policies, which are integral to modern control systems, represent valuable intellectual property. The development of these policies demands considerable resources, such as domain expertise, simulation fidelity, and real-world validation. These policies are potentially vulnerable to model stealing attacks, which aim to replicate their functionality using only black-box access. In this paper, we propose Stealthy Imitation, the first attack designed to steal policies without access to the environment or knowledge of the input range. This setup has not been considered by previous model stealing methods. Lacking access to the victim's input states distribution, Stealthy Imitation fits a reward model that allows to approximate it. We show that the victim policy is harder to imitate when the distribution of the attack queries matches that of the victim. We evaluate…
Peer Reviews
Decision·ICML 2024 Poster
- Innovative Approach: Represents an advancement in the field of model stealing, particularly in RL settings, with a more realistic threat model. - Effective Methodology: Demonstrates superior performance in stealing RL policies compared to existing methods, even with limited information. - Practical Countermeasure: Offers a realistic and practical solution to mitigate the risks of such attacks.
- Complexity: The method's complexity, particularly in estimating the state distribution and refining the attack policy, is relatively straightforward and not incurring significant novelty/advancements compared to the existing approaches. - Real-World Applicability: Transitioning from a controlled experimental setup to real-world applications might present unforeseen challenges, for example, the authors only experiment on simple tasks that have relatively simple state distribution. The underlyi
* The idea is new and poses interesting technical challenges. * The paper is also clear, well structured and well explained. * The ablations are well thought out and provide a lot of insight into the details of the technique.
* The test environments are quite limited. These Mujoco environments are small, and there are only three of them. The only contact dynamics are with the ground and self-collision. Testing in larger environments with more degrees of freedom and richer dynamics is highly encouraged. * This method seems impossible for policies with high-dimensional input such as images. * The approximation of the state distribution using a normal distribution seems quite limiting, and it's an open question as to
The experiments in the paper seem to be relatively comprehensive, including an ablation study, validation of the assumptions underlying the authors' algorithm, and a defense against the attack. The results also seem quite promising, showing that the SI attack estimates both the state distribution and victim policy well. I don't know of previous work on model stealing in deep RL/control, so the work seems novel, although I am not very familiar with the area.
Some potential weaknesses include: * The writing could be clearer in some places. The proposed algorithm has many components, and some of the experiments are somewhat complex—it was a bit hard to understand the purpose of some algorithm components or experiments at first. * The setting of wanting to steal a policy without knowing the environment seems unrealistic—what is the attacker planning to do with the policy if it doesn't have access to the environment? Wouldn't the point of stealing a p
Videos
No videos yet. Explain this paper in a talk, walkthrough, or lecture? Add one.
Taxonomy
TopicsAdversarial Robustness in Machine Learning · Reinforcement Learning in Robotics · Smart Grid Security and Resilience
