Competition between self- and other-regarding preferences in resolving social dilemmas

TL;DR

This paper models the competition between self- and other-regarding preferences in social dilemmas, showing that other-regarding preferences can more effectively promote cooperation and coexistence, explaining their prevalence in human societies.

Contribution

It introduces a novel model where self- and other-regarding preferences compete in public goods games, revealing their coexistence and impact on cooperation levels.

Findings

Other-regarding preferences promote higher cooperation.

Coexistence of different preference types occurs in a dynamical equilibrium.

Lower productivity of self-regarding cooperation can lead to higher overall cooperation.

Abstract

Evolutionary game theory assumes that individuals maximize their benefits when choosing strategies. However, an alternative perspective proposes that individuals seek to maximize the benefits of others. To explore the relationship between these perspectives, we develop a model where self- and other-regarding preferences compete in public goods games. We find that other-regarding preferences are more effective in promoting cooperation, even when self-regarding preferences are more productive. Cooperators with different preferences can coexist in a new phase where two classic solutions invade each other, resulting in a dynamical equilibrium. As a consequence, a lower productivity of self-regarding cooperation can provide a higher cooperation level. Our results, which are also valid in a well-mixed population, may explain why other-regarding preferences could be a viable and frequently observed attitude in human society.