A Puzzle About General Covariance and Gauge
Eleanor March, James Owen Weatherall

TL;DR
This paper examines the concept of general covariance, arguing that Yang-Mills theory does not meet certain criteria for being generally covariant due to the gauge-natural nature of its bundles, and relates this to the role of solder forms.
Contribution
It introduces criteria for general covariance, shows Yang-Mills theory's bundles are gauge-natural rather than natural, and links this to the significance of solder forms in the theories.
Findings
Yang-Mills bundles are gauge-natural, not natural.
Criteria for general covariance are not satisfied by Yang-Mills theory.
General covariance is better understood as functoriality.
Abstract
We consider two simple criteria for when a physical theory should be said to be "generally covariant", and we argue that these criteria are not met by Yang-Mills theory, even on geometric formulations of that theory. The reason, we show, is that the bundles encountered in Yang-Mills theory are not natural bundles; instead, they are gauge-natural. We then show how these observations relate to previous arguments about the significance of solder forms in assessing disanalogies between general relativity and Yang-Mills theory. We conclude by suggesting that general covariance is really about functoriality.
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Taxonomy
TopicsMathematical and Theoretical Analysis · Statistical and numerical algorithms · Computability, Logic, AI Algorithms
