Payout Races and Congested Channels: A Formal Analysis of Security in the Lightning Network

TL;DR

This paper provides a formal security analysis of the Lightning Network, identifying vulnerabilities including a novel attack called Payout Race, through model checking and practical testing.

Contribution

It introduces a formal model of the Lightning Network's payment protocol and uncovers a new security vulnerability called Payout Race.

Findings

Revealed a known attack through formal verification.

Discovered a new vulnerability called Payout Race.

Validated the attack in a real testbed environment.

Abstract

The Lightning Network, a payment channel network with a market cap of over 192M USD, is designed to resolve Bitcoin's scalability issues through fast off-chain transactions. There are multiple Lightning Network client implementations, all of which conform to the same textual specifications known as BOLTs. Several vulnerabilities have been manually discovered, but to-date there have been few works systematically analyzing the security of the Lightning Network. In this work, we take a foundational approach to analyzing the security of the Lightning Network with the help of formal methods. Based on the BOLTs' specifications, we build a detailed formal model of the Lightning Network's single-hop payment protocol and verify it using the Spin model checker. Our model captures both concurrency and error semantics of the payment protocol. We then define several security properties which capture the correct intermediate operation of the protocol, ensuring that the outcome is always certain to both channel peers, and using them we re-discover a known attack previously reported in the literature along with a novel attack, referred to as a Payout Race. A Payout Race consists of a particular sequence of events that can lead to an ambiguity in the protocol in which innocent users can unwittingly lose funds. We confirm the practicality of this attack by reproducing it in a local testbed environment.