Decentralization of Ethereum's Builder Market
Sen Yang, Kartik Nayak, Fan Zhang

TL;DR
This paper empirically examines Ethereum's builder market, revealing centralization issues that threaten the security and fairness of the blockchain, and challenges the assumption that builder centralization is harmless.
Contribution
It provides the first empirical analysis of builder market centralization in Ethereum, quantifies proposer losses, and critiques current MEV mitigation assumptions.
Findings
Two builders produce over 85% of blocks, indicating centralization.
Significant proposer losses are linked to builder centralization.
Current MEV mitigation solutions are ineffective due to centralization issues.
Abstract
Blockchains protect an ecosystem worth more than $500bn with strong security properties derived from the principle of decentralization. Is today's blockchain decentralized? In this paper, we empirically studied one of the least decentralized parts of Ethereum, its builder market. The builder market was introduced to fairly distribute Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) among validators and avoid validator centralization. As of the time of writing, two builders produced more than 85% of blocks in Ethereum, creating a concerning centralization factor. However, a common belief is that such centralization "is okay," arguing that builder centralization will not lead to validator centralization. In this empirical study, we quantify the significant proposer losses within the centralized builder market and challenge the belief that this is acceptable. The significant proposer losses, if left…
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Taxonomy
TopicsReal estate and construction management
