Let's Focus: Focused Backdoor Attack against Federated Transfer Learning
Marco Arazzi, Stefanos Koffas, Antonino Nocera, Stjepan Picek

TL;DR
This paper introduces a novel focused backdoor attack on Federated Transfer Learning that leverages explainable AI and dataset distillation, achieving high success rates and bypassing existing defenses.
Contribution
It presents the first attack exploiting FTL's fixed features by combining XAI and dataset distillation, demonstrating its effectiveness against current defenses.
Findings
Achieves 80% attack success rate in image classification
Effective against existing federated learning defenses
Introduces a new vulnerability in FTL scenarios
Abstract
Federated Transfer Learning (FTL) is the most general variation of Federated Learning. According to this distributed paradigm, a feature learning pre-step is commonly carried out by only one party, typically the server, on publicly shared data. After that, the Federated Learning phase takes place to train a classifier collaboratively using the learned feature extractor. Each involved client contributes by locally training only the classification layers on a private training set. The peculiarity of an FTL scenario makes it hard to understand whether poisoning attacks can be developed to craft an effective backdoor. State-of-the-art attack strategies assume the possibility of shifting the model attention toward relevant features introduced by a forged trigger injected in the input data by some untrusted clients. Of course, this is not feasible in FTL, as the learned features are fixed…
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Taxonomy
TopicsPrivacy-Preserving Technologies in Data · Adversarial Robustness in Machine Learning
