A Taxation Perspective for Fair Re-ranking
Chen Xu, Xiaopeng Ye, Wenjie Wang, Liang Pang, Jun Xu and, Tat-Seng Chua

TL;DR
This paper introduces Tax-rank, a novel fair re-ranking method inspired by taxation principles, which improves fairness and controllability in ranking systems through optimal transport, outperforming existing methods in recommendation and advertising tasks.
Contribution
The paper reformulates fair re-ranking as a taxation problem, identifies limitations of previous tax policies, and proposes Tax-rank with superior theoretical properties and empirical performance.
Findings
Tax-rank achieves better fairness and accuracy trade-offs.
It demonstrates superior efficiency over baseline methods.
Theoretical analysis confirms continuity and controllability of the proposed method.
Abstract
Fair re-ranking aims to redistribute ranking slots among items more equitably to ensure responsibility and ethics. The exploration of redistribution problems has a long history in economics, offering valuable insights for conceptualizing fair re-ranking as a taxation process. Such a formulation provides us with a fresh perspective to re-examine fair re-ranking and inspire the development of new methods. From a taxation perspective, we theoretically demonstrate that most previous fair re-ranking methods can be reformulated as an item-level tax policy. Ideally, a good tax policy should be effective and conveniently controllable to adjust ranking resources. However, both empirical and theoretical analyses indicate that the previous item-level tax policy cannot meet two ideal controllable requirements: (1) continuity, ensuring minor changes in tax rates result in small accuracy and fairness…
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Taxonomy
TopicsLaw, Economics, and Judicial Systems · Legal and Constitutional Studies · Game Theory and Voting Systems
