TL;DR
This paper introduces PPGA, a private allocation algorithm that achieves asymptotic fairness and truthfulness in public goods distribution, addressing limitations of previous methods especially in large-scale scenarios.
Contribution
The paper presents PPGA, a novel differentially private algorithm that guarantees asymptotic fairness and truthfulness in public goods allocation, improving scalability and practical applicability.
Findings
PPGA attains asymptotic core solutions with high probability.
PPGA ensures asymptotic truthfulness in large-agent settings.
Empirical results demonstrate PPGA's effectiveness on municipal budgeting data.
Abstract
We study the fair and truthful allocation of m divisible public items among n agents, each with distinct preferences for the items. To aggregate agents' preferences fairly, we focus on finding a core solution. For divisible items, a core solution always exists and can be calculated by maximizing the Nash welfare objective. However, such a solution is easily manipulated; agents might have incentives to misreport their preferences. To mitigate this, the current state-of-the-art finds an approximate core solution with high probability while ensuring approximate truthfulness. However, this approach has two main limitations. First, due to several approximations, the approximation error in the core could grow with n, resulting in a non-asymptotic core solution. This limitation is particularly significant as public-good allocation mechanisms are frequently applied in scenarios involving a…
Peer Reviews
No public reviews on file for this paper yet. If you reviewed it on a platform where reviews are public (OpenReview, ICLR, NeurIPS, ICML), you can paste yours below so the community can read it here.
Code & Models
Videos
No videos yet. Explain this paper in a talk, walkthrough, or lecture? Add one.
