Constrained multi-cluster game: Distributed Nash equilibrium seeking over directed graphs
Duong Thuy Anh Nguyen, Mattia Bianchi, Florian D\"orfler, Duong Tung, Nguyen, Angelia Nedi\'c

TL;DR
This paper introduces a distributed algorithm for finding Nash equilibria in multi-cluster games with constraints over directed graphs, combining consensus, gradient tracking, and averaging to ensure convergence.
Contribution
It presents a novel gradient-based method that handles constraints and directed communication, achieving linear convergence in multi-cluster networked games.
Findings
Algorithm converges linearly under certain conditions
Effective handling of constraints via averaging procedure
Successful application demonstrated in microgrid energy management
Abstract
Motivated by the complex dynamics of cooperative and competitive interactions within networked agent systems, multi-cluster games provide a framework for modeling the interconnected goals of self-interested clusters of agents. For this setup, the existing literature lacks comprehensive gradient-based solutions that simultaneously consider constraint sets and directed communication networks, both of which are crucial for many practical applications. To address this gap, this paper proposes a distributed Nash equilibrium seeking algorithm that integrates consensus-based methods and gradient-tracking techniques, where inter-cluster and intra-cluster communications only use row- and column-stochastic weight matrices, respectively. To handle constraints, we introduce an averaging procedure, which can effectively address the complications associated with projections. In turn, we can show…
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Taxonomy
TopicsGame Theory and Applications · Auction Theory and Applications · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
