Beyond Personhood: Agency, Accountability, and the Limits of Anthropomorphic Ethical Analysis

TL;DR

This paper explores different philosophical views on agency to understand AI ethics, arguing that AI should be seen as a political outcome rather than an autonomous agent, impacting accountability and system design.

Contribution

It introduces and contrasts mechanistic and volitional views of agency, applying these to AI ethics and accountability, and advocates for viewing AI as a political process outcome.

Findings

Mechanistic view is limited for AI ethical analysis.

AI should be considered a political process outcome.

Viewing AI as an agent is problematic for accountability.

Abstract

What is agency, and why does it matter? In this work, we draw from the political science and philosophy literature and give two competing visions of what it means to be an (ethical) agent. The first view, which we term mechanistic, is commonly--and implicitly--assumed in AI research, yet it is a fundamentally limited means to understand the ethical characteristics of AI. Under the second view, which we term volitional, AI can no longer be considered an ethical agent. We discuss the implications of each of these views for two critical questions: first, what the ideal system ought to look like, and second, how accountability may be achieved. In light of this discussion, we ultimately argue that, in the context of ethically-significant behavior, AI should be viewed not as an agent but as the outcome of political processes.