Arrow-Sen theory simplified
Branislav Bori\v{c}i\'c

TL;DR
This paper simplifies Arrow--Sen Social Choice Theory by reformulating higher-order axioms into first-order axioms, making the theory more accessible while preserving key theorems like Arrow's and Sen's impossibility results.
Contribution
It introduces a simplified first-order version of TSCT, called SSCT, which retains core principles and theorems of the original higher-order theory.
Findings
Derived first-order axioms from higher-order ones
Proved key theorems like Arrow's impossibility within SSCT
Made social choice theory more accessible for teaching
Abstract
The traditional Arrow--Sen Social Choice Theory is a mathematical theory built apparently on higher--order formal language. In this paper, we propose a reformulation and reclassification of the axioms in order to obtain a simpler theory based on the first--order language axioms, keeping the spirit of original ideas. This new theory, called Simplified Social Choice Theory, denoted by , presents a sub--theory of . Roughly speaking, we extract all quatifications over --tuples of binary relations from the axioms of and move them to the meta--level obtaining a sub--theory of . More accurately, we assign to each traditional higher--order axiom its simplified first--order version such that , i.e. can be logically derived from . In this way we define a…
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Taxonomy
TopicsGame Theory and Voting Systems · Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge · Logic, programming, and type systems
