Fair Artificial Currency Incentives in Repeated Weighted Congestion Games: Equity vs. Equality
Leonardo Pedroso, Andrea Agazzi, W.P.M.H. Heemels, Mauro Salazar

TL;DR
This paper explores how artificial currency incentives can promote fair resource sharing in repeated weighted congestion games, balancing equity and equality while ensuring system-optimal outcomes.
Contribution
It provides a rigorous mathematical framework for fairness metrics and develops optimal, weight-dependent pricing policies that guarantee convergence to system-optimal, fair resource allocations.
Findings
Achieving perfect equity is always possible at the system-optimal level.
Maximum equality may not always be achievable, depending on system parameters.
Numerical simulations confirm the effectiveness of proposed policies.
Abstract
When users access shared resources in a selfish manner, the resulting societal cost and perceived users' cost is often higher than what would result from a centrally coordinated optimal allocation. While several contributions in mechanism design manage to steer the aggregate users choices to the desired optimum by using monetary tolls, such approaches bear the inherent drawback of discriminating against users with a lower income. More recently, incentive schemes based on artificial currencies have been studied with the goal of achieving a system-optimal resource allocation that is also fair. In this resource-sharing context, this paper focuses on repeated weighted congestion game with two resources, where users contribute to the congestion to different extents that are captured by individual weights. First, we address the broad concept of fairness by providing a rigorous mathematical…
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Taxonomy
TopicsGame Theory and Voting Systems · Auction Theory and Applications · Merger and Competition Analysis
