Consciousness qua Mortal Computation
Johannes Kleiner

TL;DR
This paper challenges the idea that consciousness can be fully explained as a Turing computation, proposing instead that it involves a new type of computation called mortal computation, as suggested by Geoffrey Hinton.
Contribution
It demonstrates that computational functionalism implies consciousness is a form of mortal computation, a novel concept distinct from traditional Turing computation.
Findings
Consciousness cannot be a Turing computation.
Introduces mortal computation as a new computational framework for consciousness.
Links functionalism with Hinton's concept of mortal computation.
Abstract
Computational functionalism posits that consciousness is a computation. Here we show, perhaps surprisingly, that it cannot be a Turing computation. Rather, computational functionalism implies that consciousness is a novel type of computation that has recently been proposed by Geoffrey Hinton, called mortal computation.
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Taxonomy
TopicsMental Health and Psychiatry · Psychosomatic Disorders and Their Treatments
