Criminal organizations exhibit hysteresis, resilience, and robustness by balancing security and efficiency

TL;DR

This paper uses evolutionary game theory to analyze criminal organizations' resilience, hysteresis effects, and network structure influences, suggesting adaptive policies are needed for effective disruption.

Contribution

It introduces a novel application of evolutionary game theory to model criminal network dynamics, highlighting hysteresis and optimal intervention thresholds.

Findings

Hysteresis effects challenge traditional deterrence strategies.

Network structure significantly impacts organization stability.

Stricter punishment does not linearly deter crime.

Abstract

The interplay between criminal organizations and law enforcement disruption strategies is crucial in criminology. Criminal enterprises, like legitimate businesses, balance visibility and security to thrive. This study uses evolutionary game theory to analyze criminal networks' dynamics, resilience to interventions, and responses to external conditions. We find strong hysteresis effects, challenging traditional deterrence-focused strategies. Optimal thresholds for organization formation or dissolution are defined by these effects. Stricter punishment doesn't always deter organized crime linearly. Network structure, particularly link density and skill assortativity, significantly influences organization formation and stability. These insights advocate for adaptive policy-making and strategic law enforcement to effectively disrupt criminal networks.