Blockchain Bribing Attacks and the Efficacy of Counterincentives

TL;DR

This paper examines bribing attacks in Proof-of-Stake blockchains using game theory, identifying equilibria and proposing incentive-based mitigations to enhance protocol security.

Contribution

It provides a game-theoretic analysis of bribing attacks, characterizes equilibria, and evaluates mitigation techniques like slashing and dilution.

Findings

Guided bribing is not an equilibrium, but good and negative equilibria exist.

Effective bribing can be an equilibrium, including the 'all bribed' scenario.

Mitigations like slashing can make the protocol more resilient.

Abstract

We analyze bribing attacks in Proof-of-Stake distributed ledgers from a game theoretic perspective. In bribing attacks, an adversary offers participants a reward in exchange for instructing them how to behave, with the goal of attacking the protocol's properties. Specifically, our work focuses on adversaries that target blockchain safety. We consider two types of bribing, depending on how the bribes are awarded: i) guided bribing, where the bribe is given as long as the bribed party behaves as instructed; ii) effective bribing, where bribes are conditional on the attack's success, w.r.t. well-defined metrics. We analyze each type of attack in a game theoretic setting and identify relevant equilibria. In guided bribing, we show that the protocol is not an equilibrium and then describe good equilibria, where the attack is unsuccessful, and a negative one, where all parties are bribed such that the attack succeeds. In effective bribing, we show that both the protocol and the "all bribed" setting are equilibria. Using the identified equilibria, we then compute bounds on the Prices of Stability and Anarchy. Our results indicate that additional mitigations are needed for guided bribing, so our analysis concludes with incentive-based mitigation techniques, namely slashing and dilution. Here, we present two positive results, that both render the protocol an equilibrium and achieve maximal welfare for all parties, and a negative result, wherein an attack becomes more plausible if it severely affects the ledger's token's market price.