Evaluating the Security and Privacy Risk Postures of Virtual Assistants
Borna Kalhor, Sanchari Das

TL;DR
This study evaluates the security and privacy risks of eight popular virtual assistants using vulnerability testing tools, revealing significant vulnerabilities that could compromise user data and highlighting the need for improved security measures.
Contribution
First comprehensive assessment of security and privacy postures of multiple virtual assistants using automated vulnerability testing tools.
Findings
Vulnerabilities in SSL certificate validation and SQL query execution.
Weak encryption modes like AES are used in some VAs.
Potential for malicious actors to access personal user data.
Abstract
Virtual assistants (VAs) have seen increased use in recent years due to their ease of use for daily tasks. Despite their growing prevalence, their security and privacy implications are still not well understood. To address this gap, we conducted a study to evaluate the security and privacy postures of eight widely used voice assistants: Alexa, Braina, Cortana, Google Assistant, Kalliope, Mycroft, Hound, and Extreme. We used three vulnerability testing tools, AndroBugs, RiskInDroid, and MobSF, to assess the security and privacy of these VAs. Our analysis focused on five areas: code, access control, tracking, binary analysis, and sensitive data confidentiality. The results revealed that these VAs are vulnerable to a range of security threats, including not validating SSL certificates, executing raw SQL queries, and using a weak mode of the AES algorithm. These vulnerabilities could allow…
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Taxonomy
TopicsPrivacy, Security, and Data Protection · AI in Service Interactions · Cyberloafing and Workplace Behavior
