Peer Learning: Learning Complex Policies in Groups from Scratch via Action Recommendations
Cedric Derstroff, Mattia Cerrato, Jannis Brugger, Jan Peters and, Stefan Kramer

TL;DR
This paper introduces peer learning, a reinforcement learning framework where groups of agents learn complex policies together through limited communication, outperforming traditional single-agent methods and baselines in various domains.
Contribution
It formalizes peer learning as a multi-armed bandit problem for teacher selection and demonstrates its effectiveness in learning complex policies in both discrete and continuous environments.
Findings
Peer learning outperforms single-agent and baseline methods.
Agents can rank peers' performance and identify reliable advice.
Complex policies can evolve from action recommendations beyond discrete actions.
Abstract
Peer learning is a novel high-level reinforcement learning framework for agents learning in groups. While standard reinforcement learning trains an individual agent in trial-and-error fashion, all on its own, peer learning addresses a related setting in which a group of agents, i.e., peers, learns to master a task simultaneously together from scratch. Peers are allowed to communicate only about their own states and actions recommended by others: "What would you do in my situation?". Our motivation is to study the learning behavior of these agents. We formalize the teacher selection process in the action advice setting as a multi-armed bandit problem and therefore highlight the need for exploration. Eventually, we analyze the learning behavior of the peers and observe their ability to rank the agents' performance within the study group and understand which agents give reliable advice.…
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Taxonomy
TopicsReinforcement Learning in Robotics · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Game Theory and Applications
