1/2 Approximate MMS Allocation for Separable Piecewise Linear Concave Valuations
Chandra Chekuri, Pooja Kulkarni, Rucha Kulkarni, Ruta Mehta

TL;DR
This paper improves the approximation factor for fair division under complex valuations, showing a 1/2-MMS allocation for SPLC valuations and a 1/3-APS for submodular valuations, using novel relax-and-round and greedy algorithms.
Contribution
It introduces polynomial-time algorithms achieving better approximation guarantees for MMS and APS under non-additive valuations, extending fair division theory.
Findings
1/2-MMS allocation exists and is computable in polynomial time for SPLC valuations.
A simple greedy algorithm achieves 1/3-APS for submodular valuations.
The relax-and-round paradigm extends to complex valuation classes, improving fairness guarantees.
Abstract
We study fair distribution of a collection of m indivisible goods among a group of n agents, using the widely recognized fairness principles of Maximin Share (MMS) and Any Price Share (APS). These principles have undergone thorough investigation within the context of additive valuations. We explore these notions for valuations that extend beyond additivity. First, we study approximate MMS under the separable (piecewise-linear) concave (SPLC) valuations, an important class generalizing additive, where the best known factor was 1/3-MMS. We show that 1/2-MMS allocation exists and can be computed in polynomial time, significantly improving the state-of-the-art. We note that SPLC valuations introduce an elevated level of intricacy in contrast to additive. For instance, the MMS value of an agent can be as high as her value for the entire set of items. Further, the equilibrium computation…
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Taxonomy
TopicsGame Theory and Voting Systems · Auction Theory and Applications · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
