Monte Carlo Optimization for Solving Multilevel Stackelberg Games
Pravesh Koirala, Forrest Laine

TL;DR
This paper introduces a stochastic algorithm to approximate solutions for complex multilevel Stackelberg games, which are difficult to solve due to their nested leader-follower structures and NP-hardness.
Contribution
The paper presents a novel stochastic algorithm for approximating local equilibria in multilevel Stackelberg games, including convergence proof and empirical performance analysis.
Findings
Algorithm effectively approximates solutions within reasonable error margins.
Converges asymptotically with proven theoretical guarantees.
Outperforms existing solution methods in experiments.
Abstract
Stackelberg games originate where there are market leaders and followers, and the actions of leaders influence the behavior of the followers. Mathematical modelling of such games results in what's called a Bilevel Optimization problem. There is an entire area of research dedicated to analyzing and solving Bilevel Optimization problems which are often complex, and finding solutions for such problems is known to be NP-Hard. A generalization of Stackelberg games is a Multilevel Stackelberg game where we may have nested leaders and followers, such that a follower is, in turn, a leader for all lower-level players. These problems are much more difficult to solve, and existing solution approaches typically require extensive cooperation between the players (which generally can't be assumed) or make restrictive assumptions about the structure of the problem. In this paper, we present a…
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Taxonomy
TopicsEnergy, Environment, and Transportation Policies · Transportation Planning and Optimization · Traffic and Road Safety
