Concealed Electronic Countermeasures of Radar Signal with Adversarial Examples

TL;DR

This paper introduces novel adversarial attack methods on radar signals in the time-frequency domain, demonstrating high success rates and addressing invertibility issues to improve electronic countermeasure effectiveness.

Contribution

It proposes a new attack pipeline and algorithms for radar signal interference in the time-frequency domain, enhancing stealth and transferability of electronic countermeasures.

Findings

High success rate of proposed attack methods

Feasibility of attack pipeline demonstrated through experiments

Addresses non-invertibility in time-frequency analysis

Abstract

Electronic countermeasures involving radar signals are an important aspect of modern warfare. Traditional electronic countermeasures techniques typically add large-scale interference signals to ensure interference effects, which can lead to attacks being too obvious. In recent years, AI-based attack methods have emerged that can effectively solve this problem, but the attack scenarios are currently limited to time domain radar signal classification. In this paper, we focus on the time-frequency images classification scenario of radar signals. We first propose an attack pipeline under the time-frequency images scenario and DITIMI-FGSM attack algorithm with high transferability. Then, we propose STFT-based time domain signal attack(STDS) algorithm to solve the problem of non-invertibility in time-frequency analysis, thus obtaining the time-domain representation of the interference signal. A large number of experiments show that our attack pipeline is feasible and the proposed attack method has a high success rate.