Shufflecake: Plausible Deniability for Multiple Hidden Filesystems on Linux
Elia Anzuoni, Tommaso Gagliardoni

TL;DR
Shufflecake is a Linux-based plausible deniability tool that hides multiple encrypted filesystems, offering fast performance and supporting various filesystems, aimed at protecting users like journalists and activists from adversaries.
Contribution
It introduces a native Linux implementation supporting multiple hidden volumes with enhanced deniability and performance, improving upon previous tools like TrueCrypt and VeraCrypt.
Findings
Supports multiple hidden volumes per device.
Achieves only minor slowdown compared to standard encrypted systems.
Provides a practical tool for privacy-conscious users in oppressive environments.
Abstract
We present Shufflecake, a new plausible deniability design to hide the existence of encrypted data on a storage medium making it very difficult for an adversary to prove the existence of such data. Shufflecake can be considered a ``spiritual successor'' of tools such as TrueCrypt and VeraCrypt, but vastly improved: it works natively on Linux, it supports any filesystem of choice, and can manage multiple volumes per device, so to make deniability of the existence of hidden partitions really plausible. Compared to ORAM-based solutions, Shufflecake is extremely fast and simpler but does not offer native protection against multi-snapshot adversaries. However, we discuss security extensions that are made possible by its architecture, and we show evidence why these extensions might be enough to thwart more powerful adversaries. We implemented Shufflecake as an in-kernel tool for Linux,…
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