New Auction Algorithms for the Assignment Problem and Extensions
Dimitri Bertsekas

TL;DR
This paper introduces new auction algorithms based on duality theory for solving the assignment problem, including aggressive and cooperative bidding mechanisms, with extensions to broader network optimization problems.
Contribution
It presents novel auction algorithms for the assignment problem, combining aggressive and cooperative bidding strategies, and discusses extensions to other network optimization problems.
Findings
New auction algorithms for optimal and suboptimal solutions.
Connections established with primal-dual methods like the Hungarian algorithm.
Extensions proposed for broader network optimization problems.
Abstract
We consider the classical linear assignment problem, and we introduce new auction algorithms for its optimal and suboptimal solution. The algorithms are founded on duality theory, and are related to ideas of competitive bidding by persons for objects and the attendant market equilibrium, which underlie real-life auction processes. We distinguish between two fundamentally different types of bidding mechanisms: aggressive and cooperative. Mathematically, aggressive bidding relies on a notion of approximate coordinate descent in dual space, an epsilon-complementary slackness condition to regulate the amount of descent approximation, and the idea of epsilon-scaling to resolve efficiently the price wars that occur naturally as multiple bidders compete for a smaller number of valuable objects. Cooperative bidding avoids price wars through detection and cooperative resolution of any…
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Taxonomy
TopicsAuction Theory and Applications · Consumer Market Behavior and Pricing · Game Theory and Voting Systems
