Nash Equilibrium Seeking in Networked Games with Intermittent Communication

TL;DR

This paper proposes a novel approach for Nash equilibrium seeking in networked games with aperiodic, intermittent communication, allowing players to estimate others' actions without continuous communication, validated through simulations.

Contribution

Introduces an aperiodic intermittent communication strategy for Nash equilibrium seeking, with new characterization of communication and silent periods based on average communication ratio.

Findings

The proposed method converges to Nash equilibrium in simulations.

Players can estimate actions accurately during intermittent communication.

The strategy works without quasi-periodic communication constraints.

Abstract

This paper investigates the Nash equilibrium seeking problems for networked games with intermittent communication, where each player is capable of communicating with other players intermittently over a strongly connected and directed graph. Noticing that the players are not directly and continuously available for the actions of other players, this paper proposed an intermittent communication strategy. Compared with previous literature on intermittent communication, the players considered in this paper communicate with other players without quasi-periodic constraint. Instead, the players are supposed to estimate the actions of the other players with completely aperiodically intermittent communication. The distributions of communication time and silent time are characterized newly according to the concept of average communication ratio. And each player estimates other players' actions only during communication time. Finally, the validity of the theoretical results is demonstrated by two simulation examples.