Network Preference Dynamics using Lattice Theory
Hans Riess, Gregory Henselman-Petrusek, Michael C. Munger, Robert, Ghrist, Zachary I. Bell, Michael M. Zavlanos

TL;DR
This paper introduces a lattice-theoretic framework and a message-passing algorithm for modeling how agents update preferences in a network, demonstrating equilibrium existence and convergence conditions.
Contribution
It develops a novel algebraic approach to preference dynamics using lattice theory and proposes a distributed algorithm for preference updates in networks.
Findings
Existence of equilibrium points in the preference update system
Convergence conditions for preference trajectories
Numerical simulations supporting the theoretical results
Abstract
Preferences, fundamental in all forms of strategic behavior and collective decision-making, in their raw form, are an abstract ordering on a set of alternatives. Agents, we assume, revise their preferences as they gain more information about other agents. Exploiting the ordered algebraic structure of preferences, we introduce a message-passing algorithm for heterogeneous agents distributed over a network to update their preferences based on aggregations of the preferences of their neighbors in a graph. We demonstrate the existence of equilibrium points of the resulting global dynamical system of local preference updates and provide a sufficient condition for trajectories to converge to equilibria: stable preferences. Finally, we present numerical simulations demonstrating our preliminary results.
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Taxonomy
TopicsGame Theory and Applications · Opinion Dynamics and Social Influence · Gene Regulatory Network Analysis
