Secure-by-design smart contract based on dataflow implementations
Simone Casale-Brunet, Marco Mattavelli

TL;DR
This paper analyzes smart contract vulnerabilities, especially reentrancy attacks, and proposes a secure-by-design approach using dataflow programming and DSLs to enhance blockchain security.
Contribution
It introduces a novel proactive security framework employing dataflow paradigms and domain-specific languages to prevent common smart contract vulnerabilities.
Findings
Identifies key vulnerabilities in EVM-based smart contracts.
Proposes a dataflow-based security enforcement method.
Provides a generalizable approach applicable to various blockchain architectures.
Abstract
This article conducts an extensive examination of the persisting challenges related to smart contract attacks within blockchain networks, with a particular focus on the reentrancy attack. It emphasizes the inherent vulnerabilities embedded in the programming languages commonly employed for smart contract development, particularly within Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM)-based blockchains. While the concrete example used primarily employs the Solidity programming language, the insights garnered from this study are readily generalizable to a wide array of blockchain architectures. Significantly, this article extends beyond the mere identification of vulnerabilities and ventures into the realm of proactive security measures. It explores the adaptation and adoption of dataflow programming paradigms, employing Domain-Specific Languages (DSLs) to enforce security by design in the context of…
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Taxonomy
TopicsBlockchain Technology Applications and Security · Security and Verification in Computing · Business Process Modeling and Analysis
