Bounding the Price-of-Fair-Sharing using Knapsack-Cover Constraints to guide Near-Optimal Cost-Recovery Algorithms

TL;DR

This paper introduces new bounds on the price-of-fair-sharing for cost allocation in NP-hard covering problems, using LP relaxations with knapsack-cover inequalities, with applications to IoT network design.

Contribution

It provides the first non-trivial bounds on the price-of-fair-sharing for a broad class of covering integer programs using strengthened LP relaxations.

Findings

LP-based methods outperform previous approaches on LPWAN data

New bounds relate the price-of-fair-sharing to LP relaxation quality

Enhanced analysis for group-strategyproof mechanisms

Abstract

We consider the problem of fairly allocating the cost of providing a service among a set of users, where the service cost is formulated by an NP-hard {\it covering integer program (CIP)}. The central issue is to determine a cost allocation to each user that, in total, recovers as much as possible of the actual cost while satisfying a stabilizing condition known as the {\it core property}. The ratio between the total service cost and the cost recovered from users has been studied previously, with seminal papers of Deng, Ibaraki, \& Nagomochi and Goemans \& Skutella linking this {\it price-of-fair-sharing} to the integrality gap of an associated LP relaxation. Motivated by an application of cost allocation for network design for LPWANs, an emerging IoT technology, we investigate a general class of CIPs and give the first non-trivial price-of-fair-sharing bounds by using the natural LP relaxation strengthened with knapsack-cover inequalities. Furthermore, we demonstrate that these LP-based methods outperform previously known methods on an LPWAN-derived CIP data set. We also obtain analogous results for a more general setting in which the service provider also gets to select the subset of users, and the mechanism to elicit users' private utilities should be group-strategyproof. The key to obtaining this result is a simplified and improved analysis for a cross-monotone cost-allocation mechanism.