To Give or Not To Give: Pandemic Vaccine Donation Policy

TL;DR

This paper uses an epidemiological model to analyze vaccine donation policies during a pandemic, revealing that donating vaccines can delay virus mutations and sometimes benefit donor countries, challenging the zero-sum view of vaccine distribution.

Contribution

It introduces a model showing that vaccine donations can delay variant emergence and benefit both donor and recipient countries, informing equitable distribution strategies.

Findings

Donating vaccines can delay the emergence of more contagious variants.

In some scenarios, donating all vaccines benefits the donor country.

Vaccine distribution is not a zero-sum game between countries.

Abstract

The global SARS-CoV-2 (COVID-19) pandemic highlighted the challenge of equitable vaccine distribution between high- and low-income countries. Many high-income countries were reluctant or slow to distribute extra doses of the vaccine to lower-income countries via the COVID-19 Vaccines Global Access (COVAX) collaboration. In addition to moral objections to such vaccine nationalism, vaccine inequity during a pandemic could contribute to the evolution of new variants of the virus and possibly increase total deaths, including in the high-income countries. Using the COVID-19 pandemic as a case study, we use the epidemiological model of Holleran et al. that incorporates virus mutation. We identify realistic scenarios under which a donor country prefers to donate vaccines before distributing them locally in order to minimize local deaths during a pandemic. We demonstrate that a nondonor-first vaccination policy can delay, sometimes dramatically, the emergence of more-contagious variants. Even more surprising, donating all vaccines is sometimes better for the donor country than a sharing policy in which half of the vaccines are donated and half are retained because of the impact donation can have on delaying the emergence of a more contagious virus. Nondonor-first vaccine allocation is optimal in scenarios in which the local health impact of the vaccine is limited or when delaying emergence of a variant is especially valuable. In all cases, we find that vaccine distribution is not a zero-sum game between donor and nondonor countries. Thus, in addition to moral reasons to avoid vaccine nationalism, donor nations can also realize local health benefits from donating vaccines. The insights yielded by this framework can be used to guide equitable vaccine distribution in future pandemics.