Adversarial Attacks on Video Object Segmentation with Hard Region Discovery

TL;DR

This paper introduces an object-agnostic adversarial attack on video object segmentation that uses hard region discovery to generate perturbations, significantly degrading model performance across benchmarks.

Contribution

The work presents a novel first-frame attack method for VOS using gradient-based hard region discovery, applicable without prior category knowledge.

Findings

Significantly reduces segmentation accuracy of state-of-the-art models

Effective across multiple benchmark datasets

Highlights security vulnerabilities in VOS methods

Abstract

Video object segmentation has been applied to various computer vision tasks, such as video editing, autonomous driving, and human-robot interaction. However, the methods based on deep neural networks are vulnerable to adversarial examples, which are the inputs attacked by almost human-imperceptible perturbations, and the adversary (i.e., attacker) will fool the segmentation model to make incorrect pixel-level predictions. This will rise the security issues in highly-demanding tasks because small perturbations to the input video will result in potential attack risks. Though adversarial examples have been extensively used for classification, it is rarely studied in video object segmentation. Existing related methods in computer vision either require prior knowledge of categories or cannot be directly applied due to the special design for certain tasks, failing to consider the pixel-wise region attack. Hence, this work develops an object-agnostic adversary that has adversarial impacts on VOS by first-frame attacking via hard region discovery. Particularly, the gradients from the segmentation model are exploited to discover the easily confused region, in which it is difficult to identify the pixel-wise objects from the background in a frame. This provides a hardness map that helps to generate perturbations with a stronger adversarial power for attacking the first frame. Empirical studies on three benchmarks indicate that our attacker significantly degrades the performance of several state-of-the-art video object segmentation models.