Rational Aversion to Information

TL;DR

This paper challenges the assumption that more information is always beneficial by showing that, under uncertainty about updating, rational agents might prefer ignorance over additional information.

Contribution

It introduces a framework where agents uncertain about their updating process can rationally reject free, relevant information, contrasting with classical expected utility theory.

Findings

Agents can rationally reject free, relevant information when uncertain about updating.

Uncertainty about updating can lead to rational preferences for ignorance.

The paper broadens understanding of information valuation in decision theory.

Abstract

Is more information always better? Or are there some situations in which more information can make us worse off? Good (1967) argues that expected utility maximizers should always accept more information if the information is cost-free and relevant. But Good's argument presupposes that you are certain you will update by conditionalization. If we relax this assumption and allow agents to be uncertain about updating, these agents can be rationally required to reject free and relevant information. Since there are good reasons to be uncertain about updating, rationality can require you to prefer ignorance.