A Game-theoretic Approach for Provably-Uniform Random Number Generation in Decentralized Networks

TL;DR

This paper introduces a game-theoretic protocol for provably-uniform, unbiased, and tamper-proof randomness generation in decentralized networks, addressing limitations of existing pseudorandom and incentive-based methods.

Contribution

It presents the first trustless, incentive-compatible protocol that guarantees honest participation and can be integrated into existing proof-of-stake blockchain protocols.

Findings

Provides a game-theoretic guarantee for honest participation.

Ensures unbiased, tamper-proof, and trustless randomness generation.

Compatible with existing distributed protocols like proof-of-stake blockchains.

Abstract

Many protocols in distributed computing rely on a source of randomness, usually called a random beacon, both for their applicability and security. This is especially true for proof-of-stake blockchain protocols in which the next miner or set of miners have to be chosen randomly and each party's likelihood to be selected is in proportion to their stake in the cryptocurrency. Current random beacons used in proof-of-stake protocols, such as Ouroboros and Algorand, have two fundamental limitations: Either (i)~they rely on pseudorandomness, e.g.~assuming that the output of a hash function is uniform, which is a widely-used but unproven assumption, or (ii)~they generate their randomness using a distributed protocol in which several participants are required to submit random numbers which are then used in the generation of a final random result. However, in this case, there is no guarantee that the numbers provided by the parties are uniformly random and there is no incentive for the parties to honestly generate uniform randomness. Most random beacons have both limitations. In this thesis, we provide a protocol for distributed generation of randomness. Our protocol does not rely on pseudorandomness at all. Similar to some of the previous approaches, it uses random inputs by different participants to generate a final random result. However, the crucial difference is that we provide a game-theoretic guarantee showing that it is in everyone's best interest to submit uniform random numbers. Hence, our approach is the first to incentivize honest behavior instead of just assuming it. Moreover, the approach is trustless and generates unbiased random numbers. It is also tamper-proof and no party can change the output or affect its distribution. Finally, it is designed with modularity in mind and can be easily plugged into existing distributed protocols such as proof-of-stake blockchains.