A Survey on Acoustic Side Channel Attacks on Keyboards

TL;DR

This survey reviews how acoustic side-channel attacks can extract keystrokes from ambient noise, highlighting their growing threat due to advancements in microphone tech and expanding keyboard use.

Contribution

It provides a comprehensive overview of existing research, explaining attack feasibility, threat models, and methodologies for acoustic side-channel attacks on keyboards.

Findings

Acoustic attacks can successfully identify keystrokes in various settings.

Advancements in microphone technology increase attack feasibility.

Understanding attack methods aids in developing effective countermeasures.

Abstract

Most electronic devices utilize mechanical keyboards to receive inputs, including sensitive information such as authentication credentials, personal and private data, emails, plans, etc. However, these systems are susceptible to acoustic side-channel attacks. Researchers have successfully developed methods that can extract typed keystrokes from ambient noise. As the prevalence of keyboard-based input systems continues to expand across various computing platforms, and with the improvement of microphone technology, the potential vulnerability to acoustic side-channel attacks also increases. This survey paper thoroughly reviews existing research, explaining why such attacks are feasible, the applicable threat models, and the methodologies employed to launch and enhance these attacks.