DeFi composability as MEV non-interference

TL;DR

This paper introduces a new security notion for DeFi smart contract composability, ensuring that adversaries cannot economically damage a compound service by interfering with its dependencies.

Contribution

It proposes a formal framework for secure composability in DeFi, addressing vulnerabilities arising from the permissionless blockchain environment.

Findings

Defines a new security model for DeFi composability

Provides theoretical guarantees against economic attacks

Enhances the security of complex DeFi services

Abstract

Complex DeFi services are usually constructed by composing a variety of simpler smart contracts. The permissionless nature of the blockchains where these smart contracts are executed makes DeFi services exposed to security risks, since adversaries can target any of the underlying contracts to economically damage the compound service. We introduce a new notion of secure composability of smart contracts, which ensures that adversaries cannot economically harm the compound contract by interfering with its dependencies.