Combinatorial Contracts Beyond Gross Substitutes
Paul D\"utting, Michal Feldman, Yoav Gal Tzur

TL;DR
This paper explores the complexity of designing optimal combinatorial contracts beyond the gross substitutes setting, providing algorithms for identifying critical values and analyzing specific reward-cost structures.
Contribution
It introduces an algorithm that enumerates all critical values for any rewards and costs, extending tractability results beyond gross substitutes to supermodular rewards and submodular costs.
Findings
Algorithm enumerates all critical values with poly-many demand queries.
Poly-time algorithm for optimal contracts with supermodular rewards and submodular costs.
Matching-based instances with XOS rewards have exponentially many critical values.
Abstract
We study the combinatorial contracting problem of D\"utting et al. [FOCS '21], in which a principal seeks to incentivize an agent to take a set of costly actions. In their model, there is a binary outcome (the agent can succeed or fail), and the success probability and the costs depend on the set of actions taken. The optimal contract is linear, paying the agent an fraction of the reward. For gross substitutes (GS) rewards and additive costs, they give a poly-time algorithm for finding the optimal contract. They use the properties of GS functions to argue that there are poly-many "critical values" of , and that one can iterate through all of them efficiently in order to find the optimal contract. In this work we study to which extent GS rewards and additive costs constitute a tractability frontier for combinatorial contracts. We present an algorithm that for any…
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Taxonomy
TopicsAuction Theory and Applications · Complexity and Algorithms in Graphs · Game Theory and Voting Systems
