Physical Invisible Backdoor Based on Camera Imaging
Yusheng Guo, Nan Zhong, Zhenxing Qian, and Xinpeng Zhang

TL;DR
This paper introduces a novel physical invisible backdoor attack that leverages camera fingerprinting without altering image pixels, enabling effective and stealthy model compromise in real-world scenarios.
Contribution
The paper proposes a new physical backdoor method based on camera imaging, including a three-step training strategy and a teacher-student transfer, enhancing attack effectiveness and stealthiness.
Findings
Effective backdoor attack on classical models like ResNet18
Robustness against various backdoor defenses
Successful implementation in real-world camera scenarios
Abstract
Backdoor attack aims to compromise a model, which returns an adversary-wanted output when a specific trigger pattern appears yet behaves normally for clean inputs. Current backdoor attacks require changing pixels of clean images, which results in poor stealthiness of attacks and increases the difficulty of the physical implementation. This paper proposes a novel physical invisible backdoor based on camera imaging without changing nature image pixels. Specifically, a compromised model returns a target label for images taken by a particular camera, while it returns correct results for other images. To implement and evaluate the proposed backdoor, we take shots of different objects from multi-angles using multiple smartphones to build a new dataset of 21,500 images. Conventional backdoor attacks work ineffectively with some classical models, such as ResNet18, over the above-mentioned…
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Taxonomy
TopicsDigital Media Forensic Detection · Adversarial Robustness in Machine Learning · Advanced Malware Detection Techniques
