The Price of Empire: Unrest Location and Sovereign Risk in Tsarist Russia
Christopher A. Hartwell, Paul M. Vaaler

TL;DR
This paper examines how the location of unrest within Tsarist Russia affected sovereign risk, revealing that unrest in distant imperial territories increased risk more than unrest in the capital or nearby areas.
Contribution
It introduces an analysis of unrest location's impact on sovereign risk in a large empire, highlighting the significance of remote unrest on financial stability.
Findings
Unrest in imperial territories raises sovereign risk more than unrest in homeland areas.
Unrest in Ukraine notably increases sovereign risk.
Repression costs and investor confidence are affected by unrest location.
Abstract
Research on politically motivated unrest and sovereign risk overlooks whether and how unrest location matters for sovereign risk in geographically extensive states. Intuitively, political violence in the capital or nearby would seem to directly threaten the state's ability to pay its debts. However, it is possible that the effect on a government could be more pronounced the farther away the violence is, connected to the longer-term costs of suppressing rebellion. We use Tsarist Russia to assess these differences in risk effects when unrest occurs in Russian homeland territories versus more remote imperial territories. Our analysis of unrest events across the Russian imperium from 1820 to 1914 suggests that unrest increases risk more in imperial territories. Echoing current events, we find that unrest in Ukraine increases risk most. The price of empire included higher costs in projecting…
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Taxonomy
TopicsGlobal Financial Crisis and Policies · Russia and Soviet political economy
