Distributed Learning Dynamics for Coalitional Games
Aya Hamed, Jeff S. Shamma

TL;DR
This paper introduces distributed learning dynamics for coalitional games that converge to a core solution, enabling agents to form stable coalitions through local proposals and aspiration updates, with proven convergence guarantees.
Contribution
It proposes a novel distributed learning process for coalitional games that guarantees convergence to a core solution when one exists, using local communication and aspiration adjustments.
Findings
Dynamics converge to a core solution when one exists.
Agents successfully form stable coalitions through local proposals.
The approach is demonstrated on a multi-agent task allocation problem.
Abstract
In the framework of transferable utility coalitional games, a scoring (characteristic) function determines the value of any subset/coalition of agents. Agents decide on both which coalitions to form and the allocations of the values of the formed coalitions among their members. An important concept in coalitional games is that of a core solution, which is a partitioning of agents into coalitions and an associated allocation to each agent under which no group of agents can get a higher allocation by forming an alternative coalition. We present distributed learning dynamics for coalitional games that converge to a core solution whenever one exists. In these dynamics, an agent maintains a state consisting of (i) an aspiration level for its allocation and (ii) the coalition, if any, to which it belongs. In each stage, a randomly activated agent proposes to form a new coalition and changes…
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Taxonomy
TopicsElectrochemical Analysis and Applications
