On the Potential and Limitations of Proxy Voting: Delegation with Incomplete Votes
Georgios Amanatidis, Aris Filos-Ratsikas, Philip Lazos, Evangelos, Markakis, Georgios Papasotiropoulos

TL;DR
This paper investigates how proxy delegation can improve election outcomes in systems with many issues and incomplete voter preferences, especially relevant for blockchain governance.
Contribution
It introduces a model analyzing proxy delegation with incomplete preferences and identifies conditions for improved election outcomes through proxies.
Findings
Delegation can lead to more legitimate outcomes under certain conditions.
Theoretical conditions for beneficial proxy participation are established.
Experimental results support the potential of delegation to enhance voter satisfaction.
Abstract
We study elections where voters are faced with the challenge of expressing preferences over an extreme number of issues under consideration. This is largely motivated by emerging blockchain governance systems, which include voters with different weights and a massive number of community generated proposals. In such scenarios, it is natural to expect that voters will have incomplete preferences, as they may only be able to evaluate or be confident about a very small proportion of the alternatives. As a result, the election outcome may be significantly affected, leading to suboptimal decisions. Our central inquiry revolves around whether delegation of ballots to proxies possessing greater expertise or a more comprehensive understanding of the voters' preferences can lead to outcomes with higher legitimacy and enhanced voters' satisfaction in elections where voters submit incomplete…
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Taxonomy
TopicsBlockchain Technology Applications and Security · Auction Theory and Applications · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
