Transient Attacks against the VMG-KLJN Secure Key Exchanger

TL;DR

This paper demonstrates that applying a recent defense protocol effectively mitigates transient attacks on the VMG-KLJN secure key exchanger, significantly reducing information leakage as shown through computer simulations.

Contribution

It extends a new mitigation technique to the VMG-KLJN system, enhancing its security against transient attacks in different operational scenarios.

Findings

Transient attacks can be substantially mitigated using the proposed defense.

The defense protocol effectively reduces information leakage to negligible levels.

Simulations confirm the robustness of the mitigation in various scenarios.

Abstract

The security vulnerability of the Vadai, Mingesz, and Gingl (VMG) Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-Noise (KLJN) key exchanger, as presented in the publication "Nature, Science Report 5 (2015) 13653," has been exposed to transient attacks. Recently an effective defense protocol was introduced (Appl. Phys. Lett. 122 (2023) 143503) to counteract mean-square voltage-based (or mean-square current-based) transient attacks targeted at the ideal KLJN framework. In the present study, this same mitigation methodology has been employed to fortify the security of the VMG-KLJN key exchanger. It is worth noting that the protective measures need to be separately implemented for the HL and LH scenarios. This conceptual framework is corroborated through computer simulations, demonstrating that the application of this defensive technique substantially mitigates information leakage to a point of insignificance.