Towards Robust Blockchain Price Oracle: A Study on Human-Centric Node Selection Strategy and Incentive Mechanism
Youquan Xian, Xueying Zeng, Hao Wu, Danping Yang, Peng Wang, Peng, Liu

TL;DR
This paper introduces a secure, incentive-compatible node selection and payment mechanism for blockchain oracles, enhancing data reliability and participant engagement in financial applications.
Contribution
It proposes an anonymous high-reputation node selection scheme and a Stackelberg game-based incentive mechanism to improve security and participation in blockchain oracles.
Findings
Reduces price data variance by about 55%
Ensures security through security analysis
Balances revenue among participants
Abstract
As a trusted middleware connecting the blockchain and the real world, the blockchain oracle can obtain trusted real-time price information for financial applications such as payment and settlement, and asset valuation on the blockchain. However, the current oracle schemes face the dilemma of security and service quality in the process of node selection, and the implicit interest relationship in financial applications leads to a significant conflict of interest between the task publisher and the executor, which reduces the participation enthusiasm of both parties and system security. Therefore, this paper proposes an anonymous node selection scheme that anonymously selects nodes with high reputations to participate in tasks to ensure the security and service quality of nodes. Then, this paper also details the interest requirements and behavioral motives of all parties in the payment…
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Taxonomy
TopicsBlockchain Technology Applications and Security · Cloud Computing and Resource Management · Cryptography and Data Security
