Computation of Nash Equilibria of Attack and Defense Games on Networks
Stanis{\l}aw Ka\'zmierowski, Marcin Dziubi\'nski

TL;DR
This paper demonstrates that Nash equilibria in attack and defense network games can be computed efficiently in polynomial time, introducing an algorithm with O(n^4) complexity.
Contribution
It proves polynomial-time computability of Nash equilibria in attack-defense network games and presents a new O(n^4) algorithm.
Findings
Nash equilibrium can be computed in polynomial time.
Proposed algorithm runs in O(n^4) time.
Theoretical proof of polynomial-time solvability.
Abstract
We consider the computation of a Nash equilibrium in attack and defense games on networks (Bloch et al. [1]). We prove that a Nash Equilibrium of the game can be computed in polynomial time with respect to the number of nodes in the network. We propose an algorithm that runs in O(n4) time with respect to the number of nodes of the network, n.
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Taxonomy
TopicsGame Theory and Applications · Opinion Dynamics and Social Influence · Mathematical and Theoretical Epidemiology and Ecology Models
