Collaboration Conundrum: Synchrony-Cooperation Trade-off
Tamas David-Barrett

TL;DR
This paper models large-group collaboration as a balance between behavioral synchrony and strategic cooperation, showing that social network structure influences the trade-off and can be optimized for better collaboration.
Contribution
It introduces a model linking social network clustering with collaboration dynamics, highlighting the trade-off between synchrony and cooperation in large groups.
Findings
Higher clustering increases cooperation but decreases coordination speed.
Optimal social network structure depends on ecological and technological factors.
Large groups face inherent trade-offs in achieving synchrony and cooperation.
Abstract
In large groups, every collaborative act requires balancing two pressures: the need to achieve behavioural synchrony and the need to keep free riding to a minimum. This paper introduces a model of collaboration that requires both synchronisation on a social network and costly cooperation. The results show that coordination slows, and cooperativeness increases with the social network`s local integratedness, measured by the clustering coefficient. That is, in a large-group collaboration, achieving behavioural synchrony and strategic cooperation are in opposition to each other. The optimal clustering coefficient has no natural state in our species, and is determined by the ecological environment, the group`s technology set, and the group`s size. This opens the space for social technologies that solve this optimisation problem by generating optimal social network structures.
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Taxonomy
TopicsEvolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation · Opinion Dynamics and Social Influence · Ecosystem dynamics and resilience
