Knowledge and ignorance in Belnap--Dunn logic
Daniil Kozhemiachenko, Liubov Vashentseva

TL;DR
This paper introduces new modalities for modeling knowledge and ignorance within Belnap--Dunn logic, addressing limitations of the standard necessity operator and providing a formal semantics and proof system for these concepts.
Contribution
It proposes non-standard modalities for knowledge and ignorance in Belnap--Dunn logic, with semantics, proof systems, and analysis of their interrelations and definability.
Findings
Introduced modalities $lacksquare$, $ullet$, $lacktriangledown$, and $ extbf{I}$ for knowledge and ignorance.
Established soundness and completeness of the proof systems for the extended logics.
Showed non-definability of standard necessity $ox$ by the new modalities and vice versa.
Abstract
In this paper, we argue that the usual approach to modelling knowledge and belief with the necessity modality does not produce intuitive outcomes in the framework of the Belnap--Dunn logic (, alias -- first-degree entailment). We then motivate and introduce a non\-standard modality that formalises knowledge and belief in and use to define and that formalise the \emph{unknown truth} and ignorance as \emph{not knowing whether}, respectively. Moreover, we introduce another modality that stands for \emph{factive ignorance} and show its connection with . We equip these modalities with Kripke-frame-based semantics and construct a sound and complete analytic cut system for and -- the expansions of…
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