Bayesian questions with frequentist answers
Alan H. Guth, Mohammad Hossein Namjoo

TL;DR
This paper establishes a formal connection between Bayesian and frequentist methods by interpreting the Bayesian posterior as a ratio involving the $p$-value, enabling frequentist answers to Bayesian questions.
Contribution
It introduces a novel interpretation of the Bayesian posterior in terms of $p$-values, bridging the gap between Bayesian and frequentist inference without restrictive assumptions.
Findings
Posterior probability equals prior times the ratio of the $p$-value to its mean.
Provides a generic, assumption-free link between Bayesian and frequentist approaches.
Enables frequentist interpretation of Bayesian quantities using $p$-values.
Abstract
The two statistical methods, namely the frequentist and the Bayesian methods, are both commonly used for probabilistic inference in many scientific situations. However, it is not straightforward to interpret the result of one approach in terms of the concepts of the other. In this paper we explore the possibility of finding a Bayesian significance for the frequentist's main object of interest, the -value, which is the probability assigned to the proposition -- which we call the {\it extremity proposition} -- that a measurement will result in a value that is at least as extreme as the value that was actually obtained. To make contact with the frequentist language, the Bayesian can choose to update probabilities based on the {\it extremity proposition}, which is weaker than the standard Bayesian update proposition, which uses the actual observed value. We then show that the posterior…
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Taxonomy
TopicsGaussian Processes and Bayesian Inference · Statistical Mechanics and Entropy · Philosophy and History of Science
