The elimination of metaphysics through the epistemological analysis: lessons (un)learned from metaphysical underdetermination

TL;DR

This paper explores how metaphysical underdetermination in quantum mechanics informs the philosophy of science, emphasizing lessons on eliminating metaphysics through epistemological analysis and examining different reactions to quantum underdetermination.

Contribution

It analyzes the epistemological implications of metaphysical underdetermination in quantum mechanics and discusses various philosophical responses, offering insights for metaphilosophy and scientific metaphysics.

Findings

Highlights the role of underdetermination in challenging metaphysical assumptions.

Examines three philosophical reactions: eliminativism and conservatism about quantum objects.

Provides metametaphysical considerations on epistemology and scientific metaphysics.

Abstract

This chapter argues that the general philosophy of science should learn metaphilosophical lessons from the case of metaphysical underdetermination, as it occurs in non-relativistic quantum mechanics. Section 2 presents the traditional discussion of metaphysical underdetermination regarding the individuality and non-individuality of quantum particles. Section 3 discusses three reactions to it found in the literature: eliminativism about individuality; conservatism about individuality; eliminativism about objects. Section 4 wraps it all up with metametaphysical considerations regarding the epistemology of metaphysics of science.