A note on solving the envy-free perfect matching problem with qualities of items
Marcos Salvatierra

TL;DR
This paper introduces a quadratic-time algorithm for the envy-free perfect matching problem with item qualities and fixed buyer budgets, leveraging the inverse Monge property to improve solution efficiency.
Contribution
It extends previous cubic-time solutions by proving the valuation matrix's inverse Monge property, enabling a more efficient quadratic-time algorithm.
Findings
Valuation matrix has the inverse Monge property.
Proposed algorithm finds optimal solutions in quadratic time.
Simplifies the search for envy-free allocations and prices.
Abstract
In the envy-free perfect matching problem, items with unit supply are available to be sold to buyers with unit demand. The objective is to find allocation and prices such that both seller's revenue and buyers' surpluses are maximized -- given the buyers' valuations for the items -- and all items must be sold. A previous work has shown that this problem can be solved in cubic time, using maximum weight perfect matchings to find optimal envy-free allocations and shortest paths to find optimal envy-free prices. In this work, I consider that buyers have fixed budgets, the items have quality measures and so the valuations are defined by multiplying these two quantities. Under this approach, I prove that the valuation matrix have the inverse Monge property, thus simplifying the search for optimal envy-free allocations and, consequently, for optimal envy-free prices through a strategy…
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Taxonomy
TopicsGame Theory and Voting Systems · Auction Theory and Applications · Optimization and Search Problems
